The paper extends previous literature on tradeable permits in two directions. First, the initial allocation of permits is modeled as a cooperative bargaining game between participants of the subsequent market situation. Using this framework, it is shown how market design affects the connection between 'Utilitarian' 'Nash' and 'Equal Gains' allocation principles. Second, the total quantity of permits is made endogenous through the introduction of a social planner maximising social utility. The effects of both market design and rules of allocation on optimal total quantity are described. Results are used to evaluate related aspects of International Emission Trading established by the UN's 1997 Kyoto protocol.
Introduction
A market for tradeable permits is an exchange economy with many unusual features. Endowments of the market participants are not given by nature, but are created at the same time as the market itself. Often the participants themselves have significant influence upon the distribution of these endowments. The total quantity of the goods to be traded is not exogenous either. Instead, it is usually an important decision variable of a social planner.
These characteristics are most apparent at the international level, but they also have an important role in domestic systems. In the International Emission Trading framework, developing from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations, the total quantity of emissions was set with the objective of minimising social costs related to global warming.
1 Allocation of permits is based on international agreements, reached by negotiating countries who will then become traders in the market which is set up. Initial allocation of the permits is therefore the outcome of a negotiation process between future market participants. For domestic trading systems, total quantity of permits is sometimes given exogeneously -e.g., by the international obligation of a country. Often however, determining total quantity will involve some consideration of environmental and social factors with the objective of setting a socially desirable global emission target (see e.g. Portney (1990) about the U.S. SO 2 market). And just as in the case of an international system, the allocation of permits is likely to be the result of some form of negotiation between the interested parties (e.g., the regulatory authority, firms and consumers). As has been pointed out by Joskow -Schmalensee (1998) or Laffont -Boyer (1999) , involvement of the various interest groups is a key characteristic of environmental policy making. Thus allocation of permits will have to give some consideration to the interests of each party. Because of the involvement of interested parties, fairness of allocation is certainly an important guiding principle both at the national and international level. No previous study has analysed permit trading, allocation of permits through bargaining and endogeneous total quantity in a single framework. The economics literature on tradeable permits tends to focus on the functioning of the permit market itself, and takes allocation and total quantity as given. Montgomery (1972) , Hahn (1984) , Stavins (1995) , and Forsund − Naevdal (1998) among others consider different market structures, and examine the properties of market equilibria. In these studies allocation is taken as a parameter, and the only related question examined is for what parameter values will cost efficiency be satisfied. While in perfect markets this principle is found to hold for all parameters, special allocations are needed to ensure it in imperfect ones. Similarly, in Lyon (1986) and Ledyard -Szakaly-Moore (1994) , various types of auctions are compared from an efficiency perspective. This literature always takes total quantity of permits as given. Other studies feature elements of bargaining in environmental regulation and / or endogeneous total quantity, but do not consider a market for emission rights. The cooperative bargaining aspects of regulation appear in the studies of Amacher -Malik (1996 , 1998 , who examine the relationship between polluting firms and an environmental regulatory authority. Their model, however, does not feature a market for pollution. Cooperative game theory is a standard tool of analysis in the litterature on environmental agreements (CarraroSiniscalco, 1993 , Barrett, 1994 , Chander -Tulkens, 1997 , and the total emission target is sometimes also taken to be endogeneous. In these models however, the countries bargain over emission itself, and no market for pollution rights is taken into account. Finally, endogeneous total quantity is the focus of the Integrated Assessment literature, 3 but usually neither permit trading, nor bargaining over allocations is modelled. This paper will therefore extend previous literature on tradeable permits in two directions. First, a cooperative bargaining framework (the "Endowment Game") will be used for the analysis of initial allocation of permits. This model takes the participants' payoffs explicitly into account, and enables us to investigate allocation principles other than cost efficiency, such as fairness or stability. Second, the total quantity of permits is made endogenous through the introduction of a social planner maximising social utility. Allocation and optimal total quantity are investigated in three different market settings: perfect competition, market with transaction costs, and presence of market power. The results of the analysis will show that the three crucial steps involved in setting up a market for tradeable permits − determining total quantity, allocating the permits, and creating a market with specific characteristics -cannot be separated. First, the effects of a particular principle of allocation will depend on the market conditions. One important result we will establish is that while an allocation giving participants equal gains has compelling properties in the competitive market setting, it loses much of its appeal in imperfect markets. Second, optimal total quantity of permits depends on both market conditions and the allocation rule. In particular, we will show that only the Utilitarian allocation principle guarantees that optimal total quantity remains the same across different markets. As will be discussed, application of these results to the emerging system of International Emission Trading might call for reconsideration of the Kyoto allocations and of the overall emission target.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the three classical market-models which are analysed. These form the basis of subsequent investigation of initial allocation and optimal total quantity of permits. In Section 3 allocation is made endogenous in a cooperative bargaining framework. The section first presents the 'Endowment Game', then defines the three allocation criteria that will be examined. Results concerning these allocation principles are given in turn for each of the three market scenarios. In Section 4 total quantity is also made endogenous through the introduction of a social planner. The connection between allocation and optimal total quantity is then described in turn for our three market models. Finally, Section 5 concludes. A numerical example illustrating the main findings is given in Appendix I. Proofs of the propositions are outlined in appendices numbered II−VI.
The Market for Emission Permits
In this section three models of the market for emission rights are presented. The first is the traditional model of a perfectly competitive permit market; the second features transaction costs and is an adaptation of Stavins (1995); finally, the third is Hahn's (1984) model of a concentrated market. These models will form the basis for subsequent investigation of the initial allocation and total quantity of permits. Discussion of the models' implications is therefore left to later sections.
Perfect competition
Let there be n players, indexed i = 1,…,n. Player i's activity generates q i units of a given pollutant. Reduction of emissions is costly, c i (q i ) is player i's cost function, which is strictly diminishing and strictly convex over the relevant range, and c i (0) = +∞ for all i. Let q be the total quantity of emission permits, which is exogenously given in the market. 4 To make regulation of the pollutant an interesting problem, we will assume that the following assumption holds:
Assumption 1 simply requires that total quantity of permits (i.e. the emission target) be less than uncontrolled, individually optimal total emission of the market participants. The vector q 0 = (q 1 0 ,…, q n 0 ) will denote the allocation of the total quantity to the players, where
If p is the price in the permit market, then player i faces the following problem:
and the optimal q i * satisfies the first order condition:
(2.1) As is well known, a perfectly competitive market for permits equalises marginal costs, leading to the overall emission target being achieved with minimum social cost. This cost minimising solution is obtained independently of the initial allocation of permits.
Transaction costs
The next model is based on Stavins (1995) . Let t i := q i − q i 0 denote the quantity of permits bought (sold, if negative) by player i. T(t i ) is the non-negative transaction cost incurred by player i, and it is assumed to be a differentiable function of the purchased quantity. We assume T(t i ) ≡ T(−t i ), i.e. it is indifferent from the point of view of transaction costs whether player i is a seller or a buyer. It can easily be seen that this implies T'(0) = 0, that is, marginal transaction costs are zero if no transaction occurs. 5 We consider two types of transaction costs: Constant transaction costs: T'(t) ≡ 0 for all t. Monotonous transaction costs: T'(t)⋅t > 0 if t ≠ 0. 
2) (We assume T'' + c i '' > 0 so that second order conditions are satisfied.) As was pointed out by Stavins (1995) , when transaction costs are present, initial allocation of permits can have an impact on cost effectiveness. In our case, with monotonous transaction costs only the allocation satisfying q 1 0 = q 1 * ,…, q n 0 = q n * guarantees cost effectiveness. In the case of constant transaction costs the independence result obtained for perfect markets still holds.
Market power
The third model follows Hahn (1984) . Suppose that the player indexed 1 has market power in the sense that it can set a price as long as the aggregate demand for permits is equal to q . Players i = 2,..,n continue to face the problem
6 More realistic specifications would be T(t) = |αt| where α ≠ 0 is a constant, or 
The first order conditions for this problem are (Hahn, 1984, p756) :
Just as in the case with transaction costs, cost efficiency is not automatically guaranteed. Only an allocation where q 1 0 = q 1 * leads to a cost effective market equilibrium.
Initial Allocation
Having defined the three basic models, we can now turn to the question of initial allocation. This section will present the cooperative bargaining framework chosen for the analysis of this issue. As opposed to previous studies, this approach takes the participants' interests explicitly into account, thus providing a better model for the problem of (international) permit allocation. The other advantage of such a framework is its ability to handle allocation criteria different from cost efficiency. I will first present the bargaining model termed the "Endowment Game", then introduce the three allocation rules that will be examined. Performance of these rules is then analysed in each of the three market models given in the previous section.
The Endowment Game
In the Endowment Game a given total quantity of a good is allocated between the players through a cooperative bargaining process. This allocation constitutes the players' endowments in a subsequent market game (exchange economy). To solve this game one therefore has to take into account the players' payoffs in market equilibrium.
In the market, as we saw in the previous section, each player minimises his costs taking the endowment vector q 0 = (q 1 0 ,…, q n 0 ) and the total quantity of permits q as given. Let −v i (q 0 ) denote the optimal value of player i's objective function, depending on the allocation.
8 This is going to be his payoff function in the Endowment Game. Let D i be the damage incurred by player i if no agreement is reached in the bargaining situation (D i ≥ 0). 9 We will need the net gain to player i from the agreement, R i . This is defined as follows:
, by the implicit function theorem. 8 By 'Allocation' we will always mean a feasible allocation, that is one for which Σq i 0 = q and q i 0 ≥ 0 hold. 9 D i could be the environmental damage facing i in the absence of an international regulation of pollution, the alternative cost incurred by failing to benefit from the permit market, etc. Thus, in the Endowment Game, players distribute a given amount of resources among themselves, and these endowments generate bargaining solutions through a subsequent market equilibrium. In his 1950 seminal article, John Nash connected cooperative and non-cooperative games in the reverse manner. In his model, players determined the reference points D i in a noncooperative game, prior to the cooperative situation. If they failed to come to an agreement, players' payoffs were only these non-cooperative equilibrium payoffs. In the Endowment Game, a cooperative game is played first. In this bargaining process endowments of the subsequent competitive situation are determined. If some players choose not to be present in the market, their payoffs will be the cooperative equilibrium payoffs corresponding to their endowments. Therefore here it is the "reference point" of the non-cooperative game which is determined through a cooperative process.
10

Principles of allocation
Three principles of allocation will be considered: Utilitarian Allocation, Nash Allocation, and Equal Gains Allocation. These are defined as follows. The Utilitarian criterion is fundamental in economics, this allocation rule will therefore serve as a reference for the analysis of other principles.
Defintion 3.3. (Nash Allocation). An allocation q 0 is a Nash Allocation if the solution ϕ(V, −D) it generates is the Nash bargaining solution of the bargaining game (V, −D).
11
As is well known, the Nash Solution can be characterised by a set of compelling axioms (see e.g. Forgó et al. 1999, p292) . Not only is it individually rational and Pareto optimal, the "Symmetry" axiom guarantees equal treatment of players in a similar position. Moreover, a kind of stability is assured by the "Independence" and the "Covariance" axioms. "Independence" requires that the allocation rule should not change if new, but irrelevant alternatives appear.
12
"Covariance" demands that if payoffs and reference points are subject to a positive affine transformation, the solution should also change accordingly. 13 In a setting such as climate change, where many uncertainties are present, it is useful to have an allocation rule which need not be changed radically every time new information becomes available. These axioms make the Nash principle attractive in the present analysis. 
14 This is perhaps the most important principle as far as the practical implications of our model are concerned. As mentioned earlier, it is often declared − especially at the international level − that regulation of pollution should be based on principles of fairness or equity. Through the analysis of EGAL, a possible interpretation of this fairness requirement, we thus hope to get insights into the consequences of applying such a principle.
Endowment Game with a competitive market
We will now analyse our three allocation criteria in the case of a competitive permit market, as defined in Section 2.
As we have seen, in a competitive market each player faces the following problem
and the optimal q i * satisfies the first order condition −c i '(q i * ) = p (3.1) for all i. In this case, the optimal value of the objective function is a (linear) function of player i's own allocation only:
. As described earlier, in the Endowment Game players bargain over the endowment vector q
is the set of possible payoff vectors, 15 and −D = (−D 1 ,…,−D n ) is the reference point. We are now ready to characterise our three principles of allocation in the case when the Endowment Game includes a competitive market. Our first lemma relates to the existence and uniqueness of EGAL and Nash Allocations.
Lemma 3.1. In every Endowment Game with a competitive market, there is at most one EGAL, and exactly
one Nash Allocation.
Proof. The results follow from the linear correspondence between payoffs and allocations, and the uniqueness of the Nash Solution.
The classical result that the competitive market minimises social cost irrespective of the allocation can be restated as follows.
Propositon 3.2. In an Endowment Game with a competitive market every allocation is Utilitarian.
Proposition 3.2 also means that the Utilitarian criterion does not help us decide how to allocate emission permits, if a competitive market is to emerge. The next proposition on the other hand does provide some assistance, and points to important properties of the Equal Gains Allocation.
Propositon 3.3. If an EGAL exists in an Endowment Game with a competitive market, then it is exactly
the Nash Allocation.
Proof. See Appendix II.
If EGAL embodies the principle of fairness currently put forward in international climate change negotiations, then the results above are good news for the negotiating parties. Indeed, in the competitive case EGAL seems to have very attractive properties. It is Utilitarian, just like any other allocation, but it is also the unique Nash Allocation. Therefore EGAL, besides being "equitable", is also characterised by Nash's compelling axioms.
Although we will restrict our attention to cases when an EGAL exists, it is of interest to see what happens if this is not so in the competitive case.
Propositon 3.4. If an EGAL does not exist in an Endowment Game with a competitive market, then in the Nash Allocation
2) for every j and every q j 0 .
Proposition 3.4 shows that the Nash Allocation has a kind of no-envy (or minimal envy) property. According to the result, the Nash Solution minimises the differences in gains from the point of view of those who get positive endowments. Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 are illustrated in Figure 3 .1 for the case of n = 2. 
Endowment Game with transaction costs
We now turn to the case when the market is described by the model including transaction costs, as given in Section 2.
As we have seen, the conditions for market equilibrium are the following: 
, while his net gain if an agreement is reached will be
In the Endowment Game with transaction costs our three allocation criteria do not have the same characteristics as in the competitive setting. Our first proposition is a restatement of Stavins ' (1995) Proof. See Appendix III.
With monotonous transaction costs, ignoring the special case in Proposition 3.6.(a), we have a trade off between aggregate cost efficiency, the Nash axioms and Fairness, as defined by EGAL. Only one of these principles can be satisfied at a time.
As was mentioned in Section 2, the introduction of constant transaction costs does not alter the relevant characteristics of the competitive solution. Therefore with constant transaction costs our appealing results concerning EGAL still obtain.
Proposition 3.7. In an Endowment Game with constant transaction costs, every allocation is Utilitarian. Moreover, an allocation is EGAL if and only if it is a Nash Allocation.
16 This holds iff cost functions and reference points are such that at the Utilitarian Allocation q 0 the following is true for all j and k:
Endowment Game with market power
We now examine the model where player 1 can set the price to minimise his costs. Combining (2.3) and (2.4), his first order condition is
where q i (p) is player i's demand function, defined implicitly by (3.1). If second order conditions hold, an increasing function p = p(q 1 0 ) can be obtained from (3.3). 17 Player i's net gain from the agreement turns out to be
In this model with a price setting player, our first result is equivalent to that of Hahn (1984) . As the following proposition shows, the relationship between Utilitarian, Nash and EGAL Allocation is exactly the same as in the case with monotonous transaction costs. Proof. See Appendix IV.
Just as in the case with transaction costs, apart from the special case in Proposition 3.9(a), we cannot have an allocation that satisfies all our three principles. * * * In this section a cooperative bargaining framework was used for the analysis of the initial allocation of permits. Three allocation methods were considered. While in a perfect market and in one with constant transaction costs every allocation turned out to be cost efficient, in imperfect markets this is only true for special allocations. In the former two cases Fairness (defined by the equality of gains), Stability and Equal treatment (from the Nash axioms), and Cost efficiency can be satisfied together. However, this is not so in the latter cases, where a tradeoff usually exists between these principles. Two conclusions emerge for existing or developing permit trading systems. (1) Equality of gains is indeed a very compelling principle for initial allocation, if permits are to be traded on perfect markets. (2) The properties of allocation rules cannot usually be characterised without paying attention to the subsequent market situation. 
Total Quantity of Permits
Up to now we have taken the total quantity of permits as exogenously given − an assumption which we will now relax. As total quantity of permits distributed equals total emissions in the given period, 19 the number of permits has to reflect the environmental objective of the regulation. The environmental objective should be one that minimises costs minus benefits, where costs are the damage done to the environment, while benefits include abatement costs avoided, or the value of increasing production, for example. This is also the approach adopted in the Integrated Assessment literature, which assesses and makes recommendations for environmental agreements.
In this section, we therefore make the total quantity of permits endogenous, and compute it in the three market scenarios we have been considering. An important question is whether the socially desirable quantity depends on the characteristics of the market and/or on the chosen allocation rule.
Total quantity in a competitive market
Let us modify the players' cost functions to include environmental damages:
, where c i (q i ) is the abatement cost, and d i ( q ) is the damage incurred by player i as a consequence of (aggregate) pollution. As is common in the literature, we take damage functions to be strictly increasing and strictly convex:
Consider the market clearing condition Σq i (p) = q . If second order conditions hold, we can write the market price as a function of total quantity, p = p( q ). Therefore if a social planner takes a subsequent market equilibrium as given, the problem of setting the socially optimal total quantity of permits is
In optimum we have
( 4.1) i.e. marginal social damage equals marginal social cost for each player, irrespective of the initial allocation. This is the well known Coase theorem (cf. Coase, 1960):
Theorem 4.1 (a) Once the socially optimal number of permits have been issued, a perfectly competitive market for permits implements the social optimum. (b) This optimal total quantity is independent of the type of allocation.
Total quantity with transaction costs
We now turn to our second market model, featuring transaction costs. Suppose an allocation rule can be defined as a continuous, differentiable function of the total quantity of permits: q 0 ( q ) = [q 1 0 ( q ),…,q n 0 ( q )]. As we saw in Section 3, when transaction costs were present equilibrium pollution was a function of market price and endowments: q i * = q i (p, q i 0 ), while market price was a function of endowments and total quantity: p = p(q 0 , q ) (see Equation (3.5)). The problem facing the social planner is therefore the following: 19 The possibility of non-compliance or the option of banking permits is ignored here.
[ ] (4.2)
Clearly, the socially optimal total quantity now depends on the specific allocation. (Intuitively, this is so because modifying total quantity can have an effect on (q i − q i 0 ), which in turn affects transaction costs.)
From a practical point of view, it might be interesting to know if there are circumstances under which a total quantity which was socially optimal in the competitive case remains optimal when transaction costs are introduced. The proposition below provides necessary and sufficient conditions.
Proposition 4.2. With transaction costs, socially optimal total quantity of a competitive market remains optimal in a market with transaction costs if and only if at least one of the following holds: (a) allocation of permits follows the Utilitarian principle; (b) transaction costs are constant.
Proof. See Appendix V.
According to proposition 4.2, if we set optimal total quantity assuming that a competitive market would emerge, this quantity will generally lose its optimality once transaction costs are introduced. The solution to the social planner problem only remains optimal if transaction costs are constant, and / or allocation followed the Utilitarian principle.
Total quantity with market power
Our last case is when player 1 is a price setter. The price, as set by player 1, can now be written as a function of total quantity and the initial endowment of player 1: p = p(q 1 0 , q ). Players i =2,..,n take this price as given, and set their pollution equal to q i * = q i (p(q 1 0 , q )), while player 1 chooses q 1 * = q 1 (p(q 1 0 , q ), q ). The problem faced by the social planner is
.,n q 1 * = q 1 (p, q ). In optimum, we get
Here again, optimal total quantity is a function of endowments, as these affect the price chosen by player 1. Consider an increase in total quantity. In the competitive case this would raise marginal damage and lower marginal costs -in optimum these two are equated (see Equation  4 .1). With market power however, such an increase does not necessarily lower marginal costs. If the allocation rule is such that increasing the total quantity to be distributed also increases the endowment of player 1, the equilibrium price will also increase. This will cause equilibrium pollution of the other players to decrease, raising their marginal costs.
As before, we are interested in cases where the changing characteristics of the market do not alter socially optimal quantity. We have: Proof. See Appendix VI.
To illustrate proposition 4.3, assume that total quantity has been optimally set for the competitive case, but one of the players -player 1 -turns out to have market power. Assume player 1 has a linear cost function. According to Proposition 4.3(b), total quantity will only remain optimal for some (non-Utilitarian) allocation if 0 / 0 2
holds. This means that a small increase in q at its optimal value has to be allocated entirely to player 1 (dq 1 0 /d q = 1). No further permits can be distributed to the other players, only their current aggregate endowment can be reallocated. * * * In this section total quantity of permits was made endogenous through the introduction of a social planner maximising aggregate utility. As is known from the Coase theorem, in a perfect market the allocation rule chosen has no effect upon socially optimal total quantity. This result was found not to hold for imperfect markets. We investigated whether a quantity which was optimal in a competitive market could remain optimal if specific market imperfections were introduced. We found that this would hold in general only if the allocation method was Utilitarian. The two overall conclusions we drew from this part are the following: (1) If a Utilitarian Allocation rule is chosen, the social planner need not take into account market design when setting the optimal quantity. (2) In general however, attention has to be paid to both the market design and the type of allocation, as these affect socially optimal total quantity.
Conclusions
This paper extended traditional models of tradeable permits to include an allocation process based on cooperative bargaining, and a social planner determining the total quantity of permits. Three important allocation principles were characterised in various market settings. These were Utilitarian Allocation, Nash Allocation and Equal Gains Allocation. We also examined the properties of socially optimal total quantity in the different markets. Our main results can be summarised as follows.
1. Principles of allocation and market characteristics cannot be treated separately. Allocation according to given principles leads to different outcomes depending on the market setting. Consequently, a given allocation rule accepted by market participants will not have the same properties in the various types of markets. We showed that while in a competitive market every allocation is Utilitarian (Proposition 3.2), with transaction costs or market power cost efficiency will only be satisfied for special allocations (Propositions 3.5 and 3.8). We found that in competitive markets the Nash Allocation gives equal (or "closest to equal") gains to players (Propositions 3.3 and 3.4). In imperfect markets, however, this only holds for special cost functions and reference points (Propositions 3.6 and 3.9).
2. Socially optimal total quantity cannot be computed independently of the allocation rule and the characteristics of the market. Maximising social utility requires different total quantities depending on the properties of the market and on the principle of allocation. Thus an emission target determined for a given market scenario and a given allocation rule will no longer be optimal if market conditions change, or if a new allocation method is agreed upon. We showed that in competitive markets or with constant transaction costs optimal total quantity is the same for every allocation (Propositions 4.1 and 4.2(b)). For imperfect markets, however, the optimal total quantity is invariant to market characteristics only if the allocation is Utilitarian, or if cost functions and parameters have a special structure (Propositions 4.2 and 4.3).
International efforts towards a global agreement on climate change can currently be characterised as follows. First, before the 1997 Kyoto meeting a global emission target (5% reduction from 1990 level) was suggested. In Kyoto, this target was then translated into specific obligations for each participating country. What principles this allocation exactly followed is open to debate, but (a) as various authors have pointed out, cost efficiency does not seem to have been an important criterion (e.g., Nordhaus -Boyer, 1998); (b) fairness and equity of allocation is at the forefront of the discussions and is also explicitly required by the Framework Convention. The Kyoto Protocol established the basis of a system of international permit trading system. Discussions about the specific institutions and form of this market are currently taking place.
According to our results, the following general criticism can be formulated.
(1) An allocation principle should take market design explicitly into account. The Equal Gains Allocation has many appealing characteristics in the competitive case, but will lose many of these if market imperfections are introduced. Distributive effects of the Kyoto allocation depend on the market that will emerge, and thus are very uncertain. (2) Socially optimal total quantity of permits should be computed taking into account both allocation rule and market design. An optimal total quantity computed without knowing what the market will look like, and arguably even before the allocation rule was established is unlikely to remain optimal once permit trading has started. These observations might call for an amendment of the Kyoto Protocol once there is enough information, and circumstances under which the market will operate become foreseeable. Modification of the global emission target and of the parties' allocations might be needed before the Protocol enters into force.
Natural extensions of this research would be to consider other market models and / or other allocation criteria in the Endowment Game, based on other bargaining solutions.
20 A more ambitious continuation is to try and link the above analysis explicitly to the literature on climate change agreements (see the numerical example in Appendix I for an illustration of this issue). Through the Endowment Game it would be possible to include permit trading explicitly into these models. This would enable us to examine how various market scenarios and allocation principles affect the stability (i.e. the viability) of the agreements, which indeed is a crucial question in the international control of the environment.
Appendices Appendix I: Simulation results
To illustrate the results numerically, a simple two-player setting was chosen, with quadratic cost functions of the form c i (q i ) = (q i − a i ) 2 i = 1, 2, where a i is a positive parameter. Transaction costs were also chosen to be as simple as possible:
To examine the Endowment Game, parameters were chosen to be q = 100, D 1 = 30, D 2 = 40 and a 1 = 30. With these values a 2 must be in the interval (70.49, 81.83) for the assumptions of our model to hold. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate endowments and net gains of the players with our three allocation principles, in the case with transaction costs. As can be seen from the Figures a Nash Allocation does not exist for some parameters (endowments become complex numbers), and with the increase of a 2 Utilitarian Allocation also becomes meaningless. It is also apparent that in this example part (b) of Proposition 3.6 obtains: we do not have any two of our allocations coinciding. The differences between endowments and net gains are not negligible from one allocation to the other, the allocation principle therefore also has considerable importance from the point of view of the players. ("Nash1" = R 1 with Nash Allocation, "Nash2" = R 2 with Nash Allocation, etc.)
Figures 3 and 4 depict the case with market power (Player 1 can set the price). a 2 must be from the interval (63.67, 81.83) , if parameter values are chosen as before. A real Nash Allocation does not always exist, and for low values of a 2 the Utilitarian Allocation also becomes meaningless. Although Utilitarian Allocation, Nash Allocation, and EGAL get closer and closer, Part (b) of Proposition 3.9 holds: these three principles cannot be satisfied at the same time. ("Nash1" = q 1 0 with Nash Allocation, ("Nash1" = R 1 with Nash Allocation, "Nash2" = q 2 0 with Nash Allocation, etc.) "Nash2" = R 2 with Nash Allocation, etc.) To illustrate the analysis of total quantity, the following damage functions were chosen Table 1 shows socially optimal total quantities for the case with transaction costs, for our three allocation principles and for different values of a 2 . According to Proposition 4.2 the values obtained for the Utilitarian Allocation are exactly the ones for the competitive case (for any allocation). As the main difference between these allocations arises from the fact that Nash and EGAL allocations take into account the difference in the D i damages while the Utilitarian Allocation does not, and as this difference is relatively small here (40 − 30 = 10), optimal total quantities do not differ much. Figure 5 depicts As was mentioned in Part 5 above, issues in permit market design can have a potentially big impact on the stability of the agreements. To illustrate the incentives which might arise, consider Figure 6 . This illustrates players' net gains for various allocation principles once total quantity of permits has been optimally set. Values for the competitive case and for the market involving transaction costs are given. As can be seen, the net gain to Player 2 is highest in a market with transaction costs and with Utilitarian Allocation, this is followed by the Nash (and therefore EGAL) allocation of the competitive case, then comes EGAL with transaction costs, and gains are lowest for Nash Allocation and transaction costs. The order is the reverse for Player 1. We also see that for a given player there can be important differences in net gains. Accordingly, Player 2 has a much bigger interest in the agreement, if this allocates the permits according to the Utilitarian principle, than if it creates an EGAL. In contrast, Player 1 prefers an EGAL to the Utilitarian rule. Furthermore, in the case of a Nash Allocation Player 1 has a bigger incentive to join a market with transaction costs than a perfect one, for the majority of possible parametervalues.
Figure 6
Gains with optimal total quantity; transaction costs and the competitive case q dq dp dq dp p
Substituting (III.6) and (III.7) into (III.5) and rearranging we get (III.1).
Lemma III.2. For monotonous transaction costs T'(
Proof. Sufficiency. If allocation is Utilitarian, from proposition 3.5 and from the properties of the transaction cost function, we have T'(t i ) = T'(0) = 0 for all i. Necessity. Suppose T'(t j ) = T'(t k ) ∀ j,k ∈ N, but the allocation is not Utilitarian. Then there are indices u and v for which t u > 0 and t v < 0. But then from the properties of T(·) we have T'(t u ) > 0 and T'(t v ) < 0, so transaction costs cannot be the same.
We now proceed with the proof of the proposition. We will show that if an allocation satisfies any two of our three principles, then it must also satisfy the third one.
(i) A Utilitarian Nash Allocation is EGAL. From Proposition 3.5 and Lemma III.2. the equations in (III.1) become:
we thus get an EGAL.
(ii) A Utilitarian EGAL is a Nash Allocation. q j * = q j 0 and R j = R k ∀ (j, k) satisfy (III.1) (iii) An allocation that is Nash and EGAL is Utilitarian. In this case (III.1) yields q j * = q j 0 .
Appendix IV: Proof of Proposition 3.9
We first prove the following lemma. ) ( dq dpdq dp p R dq dp p R dp Substituting (IV.7) and (IV.8) into (IV.6) and rearranging, we get (IV.2).
To prove the proposition, we proceed in the same way as we did in Appendix III. Comparing this to (4.1), the following has to hold for optimal total quantities to be the same: 
∑
. Substituting these into (VI.2) and simplifying, we have (4.4).
